ABSTRACT Proximity-based service (ProSe) provides direct communications among smart sensor nodes in proximity which aims at reserving resource consumption and alleviating the load in base stations, which is a promising solution for smart sensor systems that possess limited computing and energy resources. During the ProSe direct communications, most of the prior art security methods are usually provided by the ProSe function and are based on complex cryptography. However, despite the computing complexity, it is difficult for cryptographic methods to detect clone attack which is a common kind of attack in sensor systems. Clone nodes feature different physical positions but claim colliding IDs with captured nodes. Thus, clone nodes can be detected by spatial differences, in particular, by the surveillance of physical layer channel state information (CSI). However, CSI is not absolute static due to the random noise in wireless propagation environment. Accordingly, the detection accuracy varies with the stability of CSI. To address this challenge, we take the first attempt to introduce physical layer reputation and then elaborate the physical layer reputation based clone detection protocol to detect clone attack in multiple scenarios. The proposed protocol significantly improves the detection rate and false alarm rate and it is validated both by simulations and realizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart sensor networks normally consist of low cost and resource constrained sensor nodes and these nodes are always applied in depopulated zones, barely under supervision. Consequently, the security performance of the network is highly constrained and it is prone to various attacks, for example, malicious node attacks. In active researches, reputation is introduced to detect malicious nodes. The core idea of CON-FIDANT protocol [1] and OCEAN protocol [2] is to keep neighbor nodes under surveillance and acquire reputations from their communication behaviors. If the reputation is lower than a certain threshold, attack alarm will be triggered. In protocols as CORE [3] and BRSN [4] , reputation acquisition method combines the first-hand and second-hand information, whereby scattering watchdogs across the network. However, slandering is a common weakness among those protocols. Prior art researches have tried to address this challenge by degrading reputations of slander nodes as [5] , or by depending on extra reputations of evaluation behavior as [6] . Nonetheless, the first-hand observation of a node is based on the assertions from itself, namely, based on the integrity of the node itself. The second-hand observations are trustworthy only when no slandering occurs. It is also difficult to guarantee the credibility of evaluation reputation. Therefore, low evidence is a ubiquitous demerit of these kinds of reputation based schemes.
The protocols discussed above are committed to general malicious node attacks, including clone attacks. Some researchers have devoted themselves to concentrating on clone attack detection. Clone attack is one of the crucial malicious node attacks. To launch clone attack, the adversary first captures a legitimate node and sneaks all the confidential information. In the next moment, he is able to scatter clone nodes across the network by claiming the same identity of the captured node. The foundation of clone detection are colliding identities and different locations. To elaborate, clone nodes possess different locations from the captured nodes, although they all claim the same identity. Parno et al. [7] proposes four approaches to detect clone attack which are known as Node-To-Network Broadcasting, Deterministic Multicast, Randomized Multicast and LineSelected Multicast (LSM). Preliminarily, Node-To-Network Broadcasting detects colliding identities by flooding the location information all over the network. Further, Deterministic Multicast decreases the communication cost by broadcasting the information to a limited number of determined witness nodes. Alternatively, Randomized Multicast makes improvement by randomly nominating witness nodes. In the rear, LSM makes more progresses by designating witness nodes following a couple of route lines. As a result, the clone attack can, at best, be detected at the intersections of witness route lines. In this circumstance, witness routing becomes a fundamental design objective since the detection performance is highly constrained by the quantity and distribution of the witness route intersections. To achieve a better detection coverage, Zeng in RAWL [8] takes steps forward to come down in favor of random walking witness routes, no longer straight routes. To take a next step, [9] and [10] propose two more complex witness routing algorithms, LSCD and ERCD, while reducing memory cost and extending network lifetime. In spite of the complexity of routing, the potential of miss detection escalates with the increasing number of failing witness nodes.
The recent technology breakthrough provides a promising solution to address the above challenges by utilizing the non-repudiation of physical layer characteristics of devices. Physical layer security has been continuously expanding its application scope [11] - [13] . Physical layer channel state information (CSI) features good spatial differentiability and analytical unbreakability. It has been demonstrated by theory [14] and experiments [15] , [16] that channel realizations are essentially diacritical when the transmitters are separated by more than half a wavelength. Accordingly, CSI based clone detection methods step on the stage by taking advantages of CSI uniqueness [17] , [18] . To elaborate upon this idea, receivers extract useful information from noisy CSI traces and compare it with an appropriate reference CSI.
If they are not similar enough, a clone attack alarm will be triggered. Correspondingly, locations are not claimed by transmitters or watchdogs and no witness routing is involved. The CSI based detection are better making its way against demerits of conservative solutions. Nonetheless, CSI is not absolute static which accordingly degrades detection accuracy. The comparison of the afore mentioned methods are presented in Table 1 .
Proximity-based service (ProSe) is able to provide direct discovery and direct communication [20] in sensor systems. In general, the ProSe function discovers sensor nodes in proximity and authorizes them to communicate without base stations. The existing security mechanism in ProSe is accomplished at ProSe function which is mostly secret keys management [21] . Once legitimate nodes are captured, the attacker will get all the confidential information, including secret keys, and conduct clone attack. In this case, the ProSe function is not able to distinguish the clone nodes by secret keys which might leads to great loses. Among all the existing clone detection methods, the CSI based detection method features low resource consumption which corresponds to the aim of ProSe. However, as afore mentioned, the CSI is never absolute static due to the nature of wireless propagation. In order to make up for this shortcoming, a novel physical layer reputation based clone detection (PRCD) protocol for ProSe is proposed in this article. CSI from multiple packets is appropriately extracted and accumulated to generate reputations. Clone detection is processed periodically by reputation assessment. This physical layer reputation is immune to dishonesty, slander, failing witness and channel noise. In addition, different clone attacks are deliberated about and detected efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, the network model and adversary model are elaborated in Section II. Secondly, the PRCD protocol is elaborated in Section III. Then, the performance of PRCD protocol and the experiment results are analyzed in Section IV. At last, the conclusion is provided in Section V. 
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NETWORK MODEL
The ProSe network model is illustrated in Figure 1 . The interfaces between sensor nodes, BS and ProSe function are wireless. The interface between ProSe sensor nodes can be one-to-many or point-to-point. In this article, it is assumed that the sensors in the network are motionless which results in a long coherence time. The ProSe function discovers the nodes in proximity and authorizes them to conduct direct communication. Considering multiple sensor nodes in proximity, the ProSe function divides them into clusters and assigns group IDs to them. One cluster-head node is selected in each cluster, as shown in Figure 2 . In this article, it is assumed that there are N sensor nodes in proximity, N ∈ Z , including four cluster-head nodes, ch i , i = 1, 2, 3, 4. General sensor nodes {n g |g = 1, 2, · · · , N − 4} are organized into local clusters. Signaling messages are transmitted from general sensor node to ProSe function by the relaying of cluster-head node.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
We assume that the adversaries are only capable of capturing a limited number of nodes in the network and the ProSe function should always be secure and trusted. The nodes which are controlled by adversaries are referred to as captured nodes. The untouched nodes are regarding as general nodes. Adversaries reproduce replicas of captured nodes, namely clone nodes, and deploy them in the network. Adversaries attempt to conceal the existence of clone nodes and cover for each other. It is assumed that adversaries only allocate clone nodes within the same coverage of the ProSe function as their captured nodes.
As shown in Figure 2 , there are four clusters and the cluster-head nodes are ch 1 , ch 2 , ch 3 , ch 4 . There are six clone nodes duplicated from four captured nodes, as shown in Table 2 . Note that the clone node cl 2 1 becomes cluster-head node ch 2 .
III. PRCD PROTOCOL
The proposed PRCD protocol is designed to detect all kinds of clone attacks as previously mentioned. It consists of three stages: initiation, data transmission and clone detection. The initiation is conducted at the beginning of the system, followed by data transmission. The clone detection is performed periodically and the data transmission starts up again afterwards. The proposed protocol is illustrated in the flow chart Figure 3 and elaborated as follows. 
A. INITIATION STAGE
After ProSe direct discovery, the ProSe function nominates the cluster-head nodes. Each node becomes a cluster-head node with an average probability of p, 0 < p < 1. To avoid hot nodes in the system, cluster-head nodes should be shifted, otherwise they might be memory overflowed or die away quickly. The cluster-head nodes broadcast their status and each general node chooses the nearest cluster-head node to respond with its ID and pilot. The cluster-head nodes record the IDs and extract the physical layer CSI, i.e., the channel matrixes, as the initial channel matrixes H g,0 , g = 1, 2, · · · , N .
B. DATA TRANSMISSION STAGE
After the clusters determined, as shown in Figure 2 , general sensor nodes n g begin to transmit messages m g,t to clusterhead nodes ch i at timeslot t, as shown in formula (1), where t = 1, 2, · · · and pilot g,t is the pilot which is used to estimate channel information.
(1)
The cluster-head node ch i estimates the channel from pilot g,t to get the incoming CSI H g,t at timeslot t, as shown in formula (2)
where
is the center frequency. W is the bandwidth. M is the number of the frequency over the bandwidth of the cluster. There are several ways to get the channel differences, as shown in formula (3) - (7):
where x (t) > 0, x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, are the channel differences and s = 1, 2, · · · . A returns the 2-norm of the matrix A. Therefore, reputations correspond to different channel difference algorithms, as in formula (8):
where R x i n g , t > 0. The initial reputation is assumed as R x i n g , 0 = 0. The closer the channel matrixes are, the bigger the probability of the legality of the transmitting nodes are, and the greater the reputation values are.
It is worth noting that the reputation of the node n g is generated and recorded by the cluster-head node ch i and even the node n g itself does not know its own reputation value. On the other hand, the cluster-head node ch i gets the reputation from the physical layer channel information which will never lie for any nodes. This ensures the reliability and non-repudiation of the reputation solution. The reputation list is shown in Table 3 . 
C. CLONE DETECTION STAGE
After a period of τ , where τ > 0 is less than the channel coherence time, the ProSe function triggers a clone detection procedure by broadcasting the clone detection request. There are three procedures to detect the clone attack: 1) A reputation assessment procedure to detect the clone nodes within the same cluster, as the node ca 1 will not be detected in this procedure because the cluster-head node ch 2 will cover for them. 3) A leak detection procedure to detect the rest of the clone nodes which are so smart to pass the former detections like the clone node cl 1 2 , cl 2 3 and cl 1 4 in Figure 2 .
1) REPUTATION ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
Most of the clone attacks happen during the data transmission stage because the detection stage is much shorter than the transmission stage. The cluster-head node will forward the messages from the recorded nodes in the clustering procedure and will discard the messages from other nodes. As a result, in the data transmission stage, the adversaries try to deploy the clone nodes within the same cluster to make sure that their messages will not be discarded, as ca 1 and cl 1 1 in Figure 2 . In reality, there may be several clone nodes in the same cluster with the captured node ca 1 though only one is taken as an example.
After receiving the clone detection request, the clusterhead nodes ch i begin to assess reputations in their Reputation List. The null hypothesis H 0 represents that the nodes can be trusted. The alternative hypothesis H 1 represents that clone attacks happen:
If there are nodes with different channels but the same ID, the reputation value R x i n g , t will be lower than the threshold θ x . Thus the cluster-head node ch i will find that clone attacks happened. It will delete these nodes and report the clone node IDs to the ProSe function. The ProSe function lists the clone IDs in the Clone Node List, as shown in Table 4 .
Take Figure 2 as an example, the cluster-head node ch 1 will report the ID of the node ca 1 and cl 1 1 to the ProSe function and VOLUME 7, 2019 delete them in the cluster. Note that, the cluster-head node ch 2 will not report any clone attacks because itself is a clone node cl 2 1 and it will try to protect the clone node cl 2 3 and cl 1 4 by not reporting their IDs. The cluster-head node ch 3 will not report clone attack too, because the captured node ca 3 is the clusterhead ch 3 and it does not find any conflicts of the IDs in its cluster. The cluster-head node ch 4 also will not report clone attack because the cluster-head node ch 4 is a clone node cl 1 2 and it will never report the captured node ca 2 to hide itself and pretend to be the real ca 2 . These clone attacks will be detected later.
The
Thus, the adversaries deploy the clone nodes in the data transmission stage with a probability of
which is approaching to 1 and
clone nodes can be detected in the reputation assessment procedure where l ∈ N is the number of the clone nodes. However, there are still a few of the clone nodes, l · τ d τ clone nodes, have been leaked away. These clone nodes were deployed at the beginning of a new round and scattered in different clusters. Some clone nodes even have chance to be selected as cluster-head nodes. To detect these clone nodes, we need to perform the holistic detection procedure and the leak detection procedure.
2) HOLISTIC DETECTION PROCEDURE
During the holistic detection procedure, the ProSe function broadcasts a holistic detection request. All the cluster-head nodes report all the node IDs in their clusters including the IDs of themselves as requested. The clone node IDs which have been sent in the reputation assessment procedure will not be sent again. The ProSe function compares the received node IDs with each other and with the IDs in the Clone Node List. If there are any IDs appear more than once, the ProSe function will add the IDs into the Clone Node List. In Figure 2 , the cluster-head ch 1 will not report the ID of the captured node ca 1 and the clone node cl 1 1 again, because they have been reported in the reputation assessment procedure. The cluster-head node ch 2 and ch 3 will report the IDs of themselves and the IDs of the clone node cl 1 3 and the captured node ca 4 which leads to the result that the ProSe function will receive the ID of the captured node ca 3 more than once and find that the node ch 2 has the same ID as the captured node ca 1 in the Clone Node List. The ProSe function will decide that the clone attack has happened and add the ID of the captured node ca 3 to the Clone Node List. However, the ProSe function will not find that the node ca 4 1 4 are so smart such that they have passed two detection procedures and still remain undetected. A leak detection procedure is needed to arrest these smart malicious nodes.
3) LEAK DETECTION PROCEDURE
The ProSe function broadcasts a leak detection request and re-cluster all the nodes. One cluster-head node is not allowed to serve for another term consecutively. The general nodes are required to report their IDs to the new cluster-head nodes. Then the new cluster-head nodes report the node IDs in their clusters to the ProSe function and the ProSe function checks the received IDs to find if there are any clone nodes left.
After the re-clustering, the new scenario is shown in Figure 4 . There are five clusters within the sink ring which is one more cluster than in Figure 2 , because the probability to be a cluster-head node for each node will change according to the energy remained. The average probability is p and the average number of clusters is Np , N is the number of the sensor nodes in proximity. As a result, the actual number of the clusters may be more or less than Np sometimes. In Figure 4 , the new cluster-head node ch 1 , ch 2 , ch 3 , ch 4 and ch 5 send the node IDs in their clusters to the ProSe function. The ProSe function compares the received IDs with each other and with the IDs in the Clone Node List. Obviously, the new cluster-head node ch 1 , ch 2 and ch 4 will no longer cover for the clone nodes. As a result, the clone node cl 1 2 , cl 1 4 and their captured node ca 2 and ca 4 will be uncovered. Besides, the ProSe function will receive the ID of the clone node cl 2 3 . There is no need for the ProSe function to add the ID of the clone node to the Clone Node List, because this ID is already in the list. The ProSe function will add the newly detected clone IDs of ca 2 , cl 1 2 , ca 4 and cl 1 4 to the Clone Node List. The detection of all the clone nodes is summarized in Table 5 . After the leak detection, the ProSe function broadcasts the Clone Node List and the cluster-head nodes delete the nodes with these IDs. The clone detection stage has been completed and a new data transmission stage begins.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In what follows, we focus on the detection probability which depends on the node reputation R i n g , t based on the difference of the channel x (t). Our purpose of replacing the channel difference with the node reputation is to enlarge the differences between legal and illegal messages. We accumulate the channel differences and perform the clone detection procedure every τ time period. To simplify the proof, we take 1 (t) as an example. The formula (8) can be written as:
.
(10)
Theorem 1: If there exists clone nodes in the same cluster, the clone attack can be detected with a probability of
Proof: We take cluster 1 in Figure 2 as an example. The clone node cl 1 1 and the captured node ca 1 both send messages to the cluster-head node ch 1 . In AWGN channel (Additive White Gaussian Noise channel), the channel difference between the captured node ca 1 and the cluster-head node ch 1 at timeslot t is denoted by ca 1 (t). The channel difference between the clone node cl 1 1 and the cluster-head node ch 1 at timeslot t is denoted by cl 1 (t). To simplify, we assume ca 1 (t) and cl 1 (t) follow the normal distribution independently, i.e., ca
cl , where µ ca 1 and µ cl 1 , σ 2 ca and σ 2 cl denote the expectations and variances of ca 1 (t) and cl 1 (t), respectively and µ ca 1 > µ cl 1 > 0. The cluster-head node has an equal chance to receive the messages from the captured node and the clone node. Thus we assume the cluster-head node has received T messages from the captured node and T messages from the clone node, where T > 1. We divide the reputation into two parts, R ca and R cl , where R ca is accumulated from ca 1 (t) and R cl is accumulated from cl 1 (t). Considering the property of the normal distribution, we obtain that 1 R ca and 1 R cl obey the normal distribution too, as shown in formula (11) and (12):
According to the property of the normal distribution, the difference between the reputations of the captured node and the clone node obey the normal distribution too, as in formula (13):
The PRCD protocol is based on the difference between the reputations of the captured node and the clone node. If we are able to prove that the difference can be detected, we will be able to prove theorem 1. Therefore, we focus on the proof of P(|R ca − R cl | > 0) = 1 − ε, ∀ε > 0. Firstly, we transform the left part of the equation as the following:
From formula (11)- (13) and the property of the normal distribution, we can get the formula (15):
Bring formula (15) into formula (14), we get formula (16):
From formula (16), we can get that the probability of the existence of the difference between R ca and R cl is arbitrarily close to 1. Thus, the detection probability P d is arbitrarily close to 1. That is
In fact, the boundary between the reputation accumulated from ca 1 (t) and the reputation accumulated from cl 1 (t), i.e., R ca and R cl , is clear even under low SNR scenarios.
Theorem 2: After receiving t messages, d PR is the difference between the legitimate messages and the illegitimate messages in PRCD protocol and d CF is the difference in CFCD protocol, where
Proof: The difference between the legitimate messages and the illegitimate messages in CFCD protocol is
As we discussed in theorem 1, ca
From formula (17), we get
Owing to µ ca 1 > µ cl 1 > 0 as we assumed before, we get formula (18) :
Thus, the difference in PRCD protocol between the legitimate messages and the illegitimate messages is as t times as the difference from one message. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3: The memory cost of the PRCD protocol is O ( 1/p ).
Proof: As we mentioned in the former section, there are N nodes in proximity and each node becomes a cluster-head node with an average probability of p. As a result, there will be Np cluster-head nodes on average. The average number of nodes in the cluster will be N Np = 1 p . Each sensor nodes are prepared to be a cluster-head node, thus they should have the same memory capacity as the cluster-head node. Each cluster-head node needs to record the reputations of the nodes within the cluster. That is to say, the cluster-head node need to record 1/p reputations. Thus, the memory cost is O ( 1/p ). Q.E.D. Table 6 shows the performance comparison between the LSM [7] , LSCD [9] , CSI based detection [18] and the proposed PRCD protocol. N w is the number of witness nodes. It is revealed in from the table that the CSI based protocol gathers the merits of LSM and LSCD. It features a long lifetime, low computing complexity and a reasonable memory cost while the detecting probability is negatively affected by the SNR. It is also revealed that the PRCD protocol is approaching to ideal. Its detection probability is approximate to ideal and the memory cost does not scale with the network. In addition, its lifetime is long and computing complexity is low.
Theorem 4: In the clone detection stage of PRCD protocol, the communication cost is O ( Np ).
Proof: The communication cost is the number of packets which are sent in the network. In the reputation assessment procedure, cluster-head nodes need to send a clone list to the ProSe function and there are Np cluster-head nodes. Thus, there are Np packets which are sent from different clusterhead nodes. In the holistic detection procedure, the clusterhead nodes are required to send the ID lists to the ProSe function. Thus there are another Np packets to be sent. In the leak detection procedure, the new cluster-head nodes are required to send the ID lists again. Thus, another Np packets need to be sent from different cluster-head nodes. To sum up, there are 3 · Np messages need to be sent in the clone detection stage. Thus the communication cost is O ( Np ). Q.E.D.
B. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To investigate the performance of the proposed PRCD protocol, we firstly simulated it in MATLAB under different SNRs. Parameters are listed in Table 7 . In section III-B, five reputation algorithms were introduced. Figure 5 presents the reputations acquired by different algorithms according to formula (8) . From Figure 5 , when x = 1, the deviation of the reputation value is comparatively smaller. Therefore, 1 (t), in formula 3 is adopted to acquire 3954 VOLUME 7, 2019 the channel difference and correspondingly, R 1 is adopted as the reputation algorithm in the rest of the article.
Detection rate and false alarm rate are two critical measurements. Detection rate indicates the probability of attack detection and false alarm rate indicates the probability of a legitimate message classified as illegitimate. Figure 6 depicts the pane of false alarm rate and detection rate for different thresholds. The proposed protocol is compared with the existing CSI based detection protocol, as in [18] , under different SNRs. The corner (0, 1) is corresponding to an optimal threshold when the false alarm rate is 0 and detection rate is 1. It is clearly illustrated in Figure 6 that under each SNR from 0dB to 20dB, there always exists an optimal threshold to reach the ideal performance of (0, 1). However, for the CSI based protocol in [18] , the performance degrades significantly with the decrease of SNR. Figure 7 shows the processes of the reputation accumulations. Even when the clone nodes send malicious messages with a probability of 0.1, there is an obvious difference between the reputation without clone attacks and the reputation under clone attacks.
The simulation has showed the advantages of the proposed protocol. The feasibility in reality is further investigated with USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) platform. As shown in Figure 8 , five groups of USRPs are involved. The ProSe function and the captured node ca 1 possess 8 antennas. The sensor node n 1 is equipped with 4 antennas. The sensor node n 2 and the clone node cl 1 1 possess 2 antennas. The communication solution is based on MIMO-OFDM (Multiple Input and Multiple Output-Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) and ILS (Improved-scaled Least Squares) is adopted to estimate channels. Some parameters are shown in Table. 8. In this article, we focus on improving the detection performance in worst case where the CSI from general nodes and clone nodes are mixed. Therefore, we choose some channel difference samples from the results, including 2000 channel differences cl 1 from the clone node cl 1 1 , 1000 ca 1 from ca 1 , 500 ca 1 from n 1 and 500 ca 1 from n 2 . The channel differences are normalized and presented in Figure 9 . We can VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 9. The channel differences from the legitimate messages and illegitimate messages. The threshold is 0.4. see in Figure 9 that it is hard to find a boundary of the channel differences from legitimate and illegitimate messages. The threshold is around 0.4, but some channel differences of the legitimate messages are higher than the threshold owing to the channel randomness. This will leads to the false alarm.
After accumulating the channel differences, the boundary between the reputation accumulated from ca 1 (t) and the reputation accumulated from cl 1 (t), i.e. the boundary of R ca and R cl , is obvious as shown in Figure 10 . We simulate the reputation accumulation procedure for 2000 rounds and 50 timeslots in each round. According to Figure 9 and Figure 10 , it is much easier to acquire an optimal threshold to reach ideal performance in the proposed PRCD protocol than in the CSI based protocol in [18] .
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, several clone detection protocols are compared. Among all the demerits, CSI based detection protocol seems promising for ProSe due to low computing complexity and honesty. However, CSI based detection protocol is sensitive to channel quality. Therefore, a novel physical layer reputation based clone detection (PRCD) protocol for ProSe is proposed to mitigate this demerit. The clone detection procedure in the proposed PRCD protocol composes of three steps: reputation assessment, holistic detection and leak detection. The clone nodes in the same cluster as their captured node, which is the most common scenario, are detected by reputation assessment. Other smart clone attacks are detected by holistic detection and leak detection. By this way, proximity-based services can provide stronger security services. The simulation and realization has proved the feasibility and advantages of the proposed protocol. The results show that the proposed protocol reaches ideal performance under different channel qualities and is resistant to slandering. Nonetheless, in this article, the sensor nodes are motionless and channels are quasi-static. It is necessary to further investigate the performance of the protocol in mobile scenarios in future.
